Nicholas J. Cull wrote an article for the Journal of British Studies examining the importance of the British presence during the New York World's Fair in 1939. It is his opinion that the British contribution on the world's stage was a carefully planned show of propaganda with the sole purpose of wooing America into a wartime alliance. His paper documents the planning, implementation and aftermath of this pavilion, in the context of propaganda campaigns overseas.
British Pavilion in New York, 19391.
Click here for a larger image.
In the Beginning:
Britain had an uphill battle in appealing to the USA at the outset of WWII. Cull's research shows American reluctance to be dragged into another war so soon after the Great War. In the interwar years, Britain focused on their reputation abroad with "a domestic campaign with posters, films and exhibitions to promote the consumption of empire products"2. They also attempted to encourage tourism along with BBC overseas broadcasts of propagandized British values. These attempts at swaying American opinion in favour of Britain disturbed American politicians rather than drawing them in and America continued with their isolationist policies.
Opening the Pavilion:
"The challenge of the New York World's Fair was to show the stable, 'civilized' British way of life in a dynamic way that would compete with the totalitarians and impress the American public"3. No small feat for a country known to Americans for showing only their best side to draw the U.S.A. into conflicts. The first hurdle to opening their pavilion was getting the approval of the International Bureau of Exhibitions in May of 1937. Cull notes that due to a lack of communication and cooperation between the British Foreign Office and the Department of Overseas Trade, no one was sure who exactly was responsible for planning the British Pavilion. Finally in September of 1937, a message from Overseas Trade came out stating "The main purpose of British participation is to foster goodwill between these two countries...the commercial purpose excluding the tourist trade is secondary."4 From this understanding, the decision was made to present Britain with a nostalgic lens and gloss over "any commercial exhibits in direct competition with American industry."5 In April of 1939, the exhibit finally opened to the public with obvious emphasis on the quality of British goods (ceramics, linens, the newest locomotive technology) along with the benefits of friendship between America and Great Britain. The centrepiece of the Pavilion however, was not the goods, but the copy of the Magna Carta. Heavily emphasized in the media as "the basis of modern democracy; origin of Britain's laws and the source of America's Bill of Rights"6 it was placed next to the genealogy of George Washington "showing his descent from royal stock"7 and ensuring the connection could be made for British and American cooperation.
The Aftermath:
By September of 1939, Britain had entered war against Nazi Germany, but the pavilion remained open in the U.S.A. Britain needed this reminder of American-British ties if they hoped to stay afloat during the Second World War. "The fair as supposed to close for good at the end of the summer of 1939, but its phenomenal success spaced plans for a second season in 1940."8 Some thought keeping the exhibit open was a distraction from wartime efforts but the Foreign Office American Department stated "it does seem a most unfortunate moment to abandon the very best advertisement we have had for many years."9 This sentiment won out and the British Pavilion stayed for a second season. The Magna Carta had a second roll to play as well. "In an ingenious twist of propaganda, they decided that the document could not be returned to the United Kingdom, for fear it might be lost the a German torpedo."10 As such, the Magna Carta was placed into secure holding alongside the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution where it stayed for the remainder of the war.
So...What Does This Mean Overall?
The British made a very good decision with their pavilion display. By concentrating their message around American understanding the strength of their propaganda campaign abroad increased exponentially. Not all campaigns need to be centred around the home front nor a countries own troops. Cull’s article shows the merits of overseas campaigns and how using an allies own domestic ideology to their advantage culminated in a strong platform for British sympathy. During the 1940 exhibition, Cull notes the exhibit “obtained documentary films of the british war effort and the BLI opened and on-the-spot inquiry service” allowing the average American to be immersed in the British message in a way they may never have been should the Pavilion shut down.
End Notes:
1 British Pavilion, 1939.
2 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 328.
3 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 332.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 350.
9 ibid.
10 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 351.
Sources:
British Pavilion, 1939. https://www.architecture.com/Explore/Revealingthecollections/WorldsFairNewYork1939.aspx
Cull, Nicholas J. "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940." The Journal of British Studies 36, no. 3 (1997): 325-354.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666741
By September of 1939, Britain had entered war against Nazi Germany, but the pavilion remained open in the U.S.A. Britain needed this reminder of American-British ties if they hoped to stay afloat during the Second World War. "The fair as supposed to close for good at the end of the summer of 1939, but its phenomenal success spaced plans for a second season in 1940."8 Some thought keeping the exhibit open was a distraction from wartime efforts but the Foreign Office American Department stated "it does seem a most unfortunate moment to abandon the very best advertisement we have had for many years."9 This sentiment won out and the British Pavilion stayed for a second season. The Magna Carta had a second roll to play as well. "In an ingenious twist of propaganda, they decided that the document could not be returned to the United Kingdom, for fear it might be lost the a German torpedo."10 As such, the Magna Carta was placed into secure holding alongside the Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution where it stayed for the remainder of the war.
So...What Does This Mean Overall?
The British made a very good decision with their pavilion display. By concentrating their message around American understanding the strength of their propaganda campaign abroad increased exponentially. Not all campaigns need to be centred around the home front nor a countries own troops. Cull’s article shows the merits of overseas campaigns and how using an allies own domestic ideology to their advantage culminated in a strong platform for British sympathy. During the 1940 exhibition, Cull notes the exhibit “obtained documentary films of the british war effort and the BLI opened and on-the-spot inquiry service” allowing the average American to be immersed in the British message in a way they may never have been should the Pavilion shut down.
End Notes:
1 British Pavilion, 1939.
2 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 328.
3 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 332.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 350.
9 ibid.
10 Cull, "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940," 351.
Sources:
British Pavilion, 1939. https://www.architecture.com/Explore/Revealingthecollections/WorldsFairNewYork1939.aspx
Cull, Nicholas J. "Overture to an Alliance: British Propaganda at the New York World's Fair, 1939-1940." The Journal of British Studies 36, no. 3 (1997): 325-354.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666741
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